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EXCLUSION OF DOWNSTREAM PRODUCTS
AFTER KYOCERA: A REVISED FRAMEWORK
FOR GENERAL EXCLUSION ORDERS
Michael J. Lyons, Andrew J. Wu & Harry F. Doscher t
INTRODUCTION
The United States International Trade Commission (USITC) has
become the forum of choice for many inventors seeking to protect
against foreign infringement of their U.S. patent rights. Over the past
several decades, intellectual property has become an increasingly
important part of the U.S. economy. At the same time, manufacturing
has increasingly shifted overseas. Although accurately measuring the
economic impact of imports that infringe U.S. intellectual property
law is difficult, if not impossible, there can be no doubt that infringing
imports costs the U.S. economy billions of dollars every year, and that
these costs are growing.1 The USITC is not only authorized to issue
orders excluding infringing products from importation into the U.S.,
but is empowered to direct the U.S. Department of Customs and
Border Protection to intercept such products and prevent them from
entering the country. Due in large part to the practical difficulties of
enforcing U.S. intellectual property rights against foreign
manufacturers and importers of infringing goods through the federal
district courts, as well as due to a number of strategic advantages
inherent to litigating before the USITC, the number of complaints
filed with the USITC seeking exclusion of infringing imports has
t The authors are attorneys at Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP. They represent a patent
holder that has obtained a Limited Exclusion Order barring importation of downstream
infringing products in ITC Investigation No. 337-TA-556. The opinions expressed herein are
those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the opinions or views of Morgan Lewis &
Bockius LLP or its clients.
1. Government and industry sources have estimated that 5-7% of worldwide trade
consists of counterfeited goods, and that software piracy alone may cost the U.S. economy
175,000 jobs, $4.5 billion in wages, and nearly $1 billion in tax revenues. See Amanda Horan,
Christopher Johnson & Heather Sykes, Foreign Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights:
Implications for Selected U.S. Industries 5 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Working Paper No. ID-
14, 2005), available at
http://www.usitc.gov/ind-econ-ana/research-ana/research-work-papers/index.htm#2005.
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increased dramatically in recent years.
The Federal Circuit in Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. International
Trade Commission2 recently restricted the ability of patent holders to
obtain exclusion of downstream 3 infringing products from the USITC.
Before Kyocera, the USITC routinely issued a limited exclusion order
barring the infringing importation of a respondent's products as well
as downstream products containing the respondent's product-
regardless of the identity of the ultimate manufacturer or importer of
the downstream product. The USITC often provided this downstream
relief when a respondent's product was frequently or easily
incorporated into larger third-party imports. Before Kyocera, the
USITC issued a general exclusion order, on the other hand, when it
sought to bar any importation of a class of infringing products,
regardless of whether a named respondent had any role in their
manufacture.4
In Kyocera, a Federal Circuit panel ruled that the USITC lacks
statutory authority to issue a limited exclusion order excluding the
downstream products of any non-respondent third party. Instead,
according to Judge Rader's opinion, the USITC possesses statutory
authority to exclude the imports of non-respondents only when the
higher showing necessary for a general exclusion order has been
made.
Downstream exclusion in a limited exclusion order is still
possible. Obviously, a patent holder seeking to exclude only the
downstream products of the manufacturer of the infringing
component itself would be unaffected by the Kyocera decision, as
would a patent holder that can name all possible downstream
infringers as respondents in the investigation. In many if not most
2. Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm 'n, 545 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
3. When an infringing article is incorporated into a product further down in the stream
of production, the product is sometimes referred to as a "downstream product." See id. at 1358
(quoting Hyundai Elecs. Indus. Co. v. United States ITC, 899 F.2d 1204, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
("[T]he downstream products affected by the ITC's order were 'Hyundai computers, computer
peripherals, telecommunications equipment, and automotive electronic equipment containing
infringing [memory devices]."')). Such downstream products may include circuit boards,
computers, cell phones, cars, or other finished or partially finished goods containing an
infringing component.
4. The vertical/horizontal distinction between pre-Kyocera limited and general exclusion
orders can be simply conceptualized as "respondent's widget and products containing
respondent's widget" (vertical exclusion) versus "all widgets" (horizontal exclusion). Before
Kyocera, the USITC utilized a limited exclusion order to exclude the first class of products, and
a general exclusion order to exclude the second.
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cases, however, the identity of downstream infringers and importers
are either unknown or can readily change. Thus, to ensure that it
continues to provide meaningful relief, the USITC should revise its
framework for analyzing whether, and to what extent, downstream
relief should be granted.
Specifically, patent holders should now consider seeking
downstream exclusion either through a limited exclusion order (if all
downstream infringers can be named as respondents), or through a
general exclusion order. In reviewing a request for a general
exclusion order encompassing downstream products, the USITC
should not look to the factors previously articulated in Certain Airless
Paint Spray Pumps and Components Thereof . Rather, the USITC
should apply the specific, and broader statutory requirements set forth
in 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(2)(A)-(B) to determine whether a general
exclusion order is warranted in any particular investigation. In cases
where a general exclusion order is warranted under the statutory test,
the USITC should apply the Spray Pumps factors with respect to
horizontal exclusion, and the factors articulated in Certain Erasable
Programmable Read Only Memories, Components Thereof Products
Containing Such Memories, And Processes For Making Such
Memories6 to determine if the general exclusion order should include
downstream relief.
I. EXCLUDING DOWNSTREAM INFRINGING IMPORTS IS A CENTRAL
AND CRUCIAL FUNCTION OF THE USITC
A. Downstream Exclusion is Part of the USITC's Historic
Charter
The USITC is statutorily mandated to prevent unfair competition
5. Certain Airless Paint Spray Pumps and Components Thereof, USITC Inv. No. 337-
TA-90 (November 1981) [hereinafter Spray Pumps]. The Spray Pumps test has to date been the
sole inquiry used by the USITC to determine whether to issue a general exclusion, and requires
showing both "certain business conditions" from which one might reasonably infer the
likelihood of circumvention of an exclusion order and a "widespread pattern of unauthorized
use" of the patented invention. Id. at 473. Under this proposed framework, the Spray Pumps test
would remain the appropriate analysis for whether to grant horizontal relief, but only after the
statutory threshold for issuing a general exclusion order has been crossed.
6. Certain Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memories, Components Thereof,
Products Containing Such Memories, and Processes for Making Such Memories, USITC Pub.
2196, Inv. No. 337-TA-276, at 124-25 (May 1989), aff'd sub nom. Hyundai Elec. Indus. Co. v.
U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 899 F.2d 1204 (Fed. Cir. 1990) [hereinafter EPROMs].
824 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 25
from imported products that infringe U.S. intellectual property laws.7
The earliest predecessor agency of the USITC, the Tariff Commission
of the Department of the Treasury,8 was created in 1882 with the
straightforward mission to investigate U.S. agriculture, commerce,
manufacturing, mining, and industry, and to recommend tariff
legislation. Its mission to protect U.S. industry was greatly expanded
in the Tariff Acts of 1922 and 1930, which, among other things,
included Section 3379 authorizing the U.S. Tariff Commission (the
then-existing predecessor of the USITC) to protect domestic
industries from "unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the
importation of articles" by directing customs to exclude certain
imported products.' 0 Although Section 337 applies to any form of
"unfair acts," it has, for practical reasons, recently been primarily
used in intellectual property disputes.1' Even so, Section 337 was
little used for most of its history. 12 But as intellectual property has
become increasingly important to the modem global economy, and as
manufacturing activity has increasingly moved off-shore, Section 337
has rapidly grown in popularity, such that the USITC issued 40
notices of investigation under Section 337 in 2008 alone, an eightfold
increase from 1975.13
Although Section 337 has since undergone several amendments,
7. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1) (2006) (unlawful acts "shall be dealt with")
8. The various predecessor agencies of the USITC include the Tariff Commission
(1882), the Tariff Board (1909-12), the Cost of Production Division of the Department of
Commerce's Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce (1913-16), and the U.S. Tariff
Commission (1916-75). The USITC, as currently embodied, was created by the Trade Act of
1974. See Records of the United States International Trade Commission [USITC], Record
Group 81, available at http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/081.html
(retrieved Jan. 13, 2009).
9. Section 337 was first incorporated in the Tariff Act of 1922, later re-incorporated in
the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1933, and currently resides in the 1974 Trade Act. See 19
U.S.C. § 1337 (2006).
10. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A)-(d) (2006).
11. Relief from other forms of unfair competition under Section 337 require a showing
that the unfair acts threaten to "destroy or substantially injure" a domestic industry, "prevent the
establishment of' a domestic industry, or "restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the
United States." 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (2006). But after the 1988 Trade Act, relief from
intellectual property infringement under Section 337 requires only the lesser showing that a
domestic industry relating to the articles protected by the intellectual property "exists or is in the
process of being established." 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2) (2006).
12. For example, the USITC issued only five original notices of investigation under
Section 337 in 1975 (337-TA-17 through 337-TA-21) and seven in 1976 (337-TA-22 through
337-TA-28). See USITC, 337 Investigational History (All 337 Investigations), available at
http://info.usitc.gov/ouii/public/337inv.nsf/AllOpenView (retrieved Jan. 15, 2009).
13. See ld.
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its fundamental mission has remained unchanged. The United States
emphatically reaffirmed the importance of effective border controls
against infringing imports while negotiating the preeminent
multilateral treaty regarding intellectual property, the Uruguay Round
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (1994)
(TRIPS Agreement). 14 The TRIPS Agreement was strongly promoted
by the United States and other developed countries, which saw an
urgent need to strengthen intellectual property protections globally,
and especially to strengthen border controls against infringing
imports. 15 As a result of the concerns of the United States and other
developed nations, Articles 51-60 of Section 4 of the TRIPS
Agreement are dedicated to border control and the administrative
detention of infringing or potentially infringing goods by customs
authorities.
Congress implemented the TRIPS Agreement in 1994. In the
same implementing legislation, Congress amended Section 337 to
conform to a 1988 GATT Panel Report that had found that general
exclusion orders issued under Section 337 violated the "national
treatment"' 6 obligation of the United States under the 1947 General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) by subjecting imported
products to different proceedings than those applied in federal district
courts against domestically manufactured products.' 7 Noting that the
14. See Suggestion by the United States for Achieving the Negotiating Objective,
submitted to GATT Group of Negotiations on Goods, MTN.GNG/NGI l/W/14/Rev.1, 2-3,
12-13, 16-17 (Oct. 17, 1988). The TRIPS Agreement was opposed by a number of developing
countries that feared stronger protection of intellectual property rights would hinder their access
to advanced technologies. Ultimately, the concems of the developed countries prevailed, and the
TRIPS Agreement strengthened and harmonized various aspects of the patent systems of
signatory countries, including an entire section devoted to border controls. See Uruguay Round
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, Section 4, Articles 51-60 (1994)
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legale/27-trips.pdf (retrieved Jan. 9, 2009).
15. See id
16. See infra note 29.
17. The Panel held that:
The central and undisputed facts before the Panel are that, in patent infringement
cases, proceedings before the USITC under Section 337 are only applicable to
imported products alleged to infringe a United States patent; and that these
proceedings are different, in a number of respects, from those applying before a
federal district court when a product of United States origin is challenged on the
grounds of patent infringement.
United States-Section 337 of the TariffAct of 1930, 36th Supp. BISD 345 (1990), 5.4 (GATT
Panel Rept. adopted Nov. 7, 1989). Nonetheless, the Panel did not rule out that in rem general
exclusion orders could sometimes qualify as necessary under GATT Article XX(d) (relating to
exceptions for enforcement measures), and outlined the circumstances in which that might be
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TRIPS Agreement, which was for the most part negotiated after the
1988 GATT Panel Report issued, had recognized that it may be
necessary to treat imported and domestically produced goods
differently in order to enforce laws relating to intellectual property
protection,18 the 1994 legislation sought to conform Section 337 to the
GATT Panel's Report by amending 19 U.S.C. § 1337 in several
respects.' 9 Among other changes, the 1994 amendment added a new §
1337(d)(2):
(2) The authority of the Commission to order an exclusion from
entry of articles shall be limited to persons determined by the
Commission to be violating this section unless the Commission
determines that
(A) a general exclusion from entry of articles is necessary to
prevent circumvention of an exclusion order limited to products of
named persons; or
(B) there is a pattern of violation of this section and it is difficult
to identify the source of infringing products.
20
Prior to this amendment in 1994, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) contained
no statutory distinction between "limited" or "general" exclusion
orders.2 ' Instead, the USITC had developed case law to determine
whether to extend the scope of an exclusion order beyond the
infringing products of the named respondents, either against
downstream products containing the respondent's infringing
product,22 or against other actual or potential manufacturers of an
the case:
[Tlhere could sometimes be objective reasons why general in rem exclusion
orders might be 'necessary' in terms of Article XX(d) .... For example, in the
case of imported products it might be considerably more difficult to identify the
source of infringing products or to prevent circumvention of orders limited to the
products of named persons, than in the case of products of United States origin.
Id.
18. See H.R. REP. No. 103-826, at 142 (1994); see also infra, note 30.
19. See S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 120 (1994); H.R. REP. No. 103-826, at 140-42 ("The
amendments are necessary to ensure that U.S. procedures for dealing with alleged infringements
by imported products comport with GAT 1994 'national treatment' rules, while providing for
the effective enforcement of intellectual property rights at the border.").
20. Congress may have tailored the language of the amendment to forestall further GATT
challenges by adopting the GATT panel's examples and adding the "necessary" requirement for
an enforcement measure under Article XX(d).
21. See EPROMs, supra note 6, at 124 n.159 ("[Tihe limited exclusion order is itself a
limitation on the relief afforded a prevailing complainant, created by the Commission without
specific authority in the statute.").
22. See id. at 125 (articulating a non-exclusive nine factor test for relief against
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infringing product.23 As reported by the Senate Committee, the
amended § 1337(d)(2) did not differ significantly from the then
current practices of the USITC. "It is the Committee's understanding
that these limitations do not differ significantly from the current
practice of the ITC with respect to the issuance of general exclusion
orders. 24
B. Downstream Exclusion Against Non-Respondents Obtained
Through the USITC is Crucial to Effective Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights
Articulating the EPROMS factors for downstream exclusion, the
USITC noted "Congress' general intent that section 337 be strictly
enforced, and its desire to provide domestic industries the most
complete protection possible from infringing imports.'2 5 In many
cases, however, an exclusion order without downstream protection
against non-respondents will provide little or no relief to the patent
holder. The manufacturer of an infringing component often does not
directly import the infringing product into the U.S. In such cases, if
the patent holder is only able to identify the manufacturers as
respondents in the patent holder's complaint, then a limited exclusion
order will not block the importation of downstream infringing
products. Moreover, even if the patent holder could identify all
importers of downstream products as respondents, those respondent
manufacturers and importers could circumvent an exclusion order that
lacks non-respondent downstream protection simply by switching
importers, or forming a new entity for importation. There may be a
large number of potentially infringing downstream products, and the
patent holder may not readily be able to determine which particular
products contain infringing components without extensive discovery
from foreign sources or destructive testing. For these reasons, the
Federal Circuit has repeatedly confirmed that downstream exclusion
may be necessary to provide effective relief.
26
downstream products).
23. Spray Pumps, supra note 5 (articulating a two-part test for relief, with eight subparts).
24. S. REP.No. 103-412 at 120 (1994).
.25. See EPROMs, supra note 6, at 124 n.159 (citing S. REP. No. 100-71 at 127-33
(1987)).
26. See id. at 126 ("We believe that exclusion of [certain downstream products] is
warranted in order to ensure that the exclusion order is reasonably effective."); Hyundai Elecs.
Indus. Co. v. United States ITC, 899 F.2d 1204, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("The Commission's
remedy determination in EPROMS represents a careful and common-sense balancing of the
parties' conflicting interests as well as other relevant factors .... ").
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In addition to the ability to reach downstream products of non-
respondents, there are other compelling reasons for a patent holder to
pursue relief through the USITC instead of, or in addition to, the
courts. First, it may be impractical to obtain effective relief from
infringing imports through the U.S. district courts. For example, a
U.S. based company may not be able to locate and serve all of the
infringing importers around the world, and the importers' identities
might change rapidly, especially in response to legal action. Even if
the plaintiff manages to identify each importer of infringing products,
joining numerous foreign importers in a single judicial forum may be
impossible because of jurisdiction, venue, or forum non conveniens
issues. Additional practical difficulties await even the successful
litigant.
Assuming the plaintiff overcomes the practical, jurisdictional,
and venue related obstacles to joining the foreign importers in a U.S.
court and goes on to obtain a judgment, the plaintiff will likely still be
unable to prevent the importation of infringing products. Unlike the
USITC, U.S. courts in a typical patent case lack the authority to order
infringing imports excluded by customs. In addition, a foreign court
might refuse to enforce a U.S. injunction or award, or require lengthy
and costly additional procedures before doing so. Moreover, a foreign
importer could easily circumvent the in personam orders of a U.S.
court simply by setting up a new entity to import its products. Prior to
Kyocera, on the other hand, Federal Circuit precedent2 7 considered
the USITC's exclusion orders to be in rem orders, applicable against
products, not parties. In addition to enabling the USITC to flexibly
craft relief against downstream products and current as well as future
importers, the in rem nature of the order allowed the USITC to shift to
any given importer the burden of certifying that an import did not
infringe.2 8
27. See SSIH Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 370 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (recognizing that the in rem nature of exclusion orders "results in an order operative
against goods and is equally effective against those who participate as those who do not
participate in the proceeding."); Sealed Air Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 645 F.2d 976,
985-86 (CCPA 1981) ("An exclusion order operates against goods, not parties.").
28. Other strategic considerations, not necessarily relevant to preventing unfair
competition, may have contributed to making the USITC a popular forum for seeking relief
instead of, or in addition to, the courts. Prior to the 1994 amendments, which provided, inter
alia, for the stay of district court litigation at the request of one of the parties to both the district
court action and the USITC investigation, a respondent might have to simultaneously defend
itself before the USITC and in the federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a) (2006). Additionally,
section 337 requires the investigation to be completed "at the earliest practicable time" and
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Although downstream exclusion is necessary and important, it
must be applied consistently with the "national treatment" obligation,
an essential feature of the United States' obligation under numerous
multilateral treaties such as the TRIPS Agreement and the GATT. For
example, the "national treatment" obligation found in Article 111:4 of
the GATT states in part:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into
the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of
national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use.
29
This provision works to prevent creative protectionism wrought by
facially neutral laws that indirectly discriminate against foreign
imports by obligating all member nations to provide equal
opportunity30 to the imported products of other GATT members, and
by extension to the companies that produce them, as compared to
domestic manufacturers and their products. Allegations that a
challenged non-tariff legal, regulatory, or administrative treatment of
imported products violates this "national treatment" obligation have
become one of the more common grounds on which disputes are
brought before the GATT.
requires that the Commission establish a target date for issuing its final determination within 45
days after the investigation is initiated, which typically results in the investigation proceeding
much more quickly than the typical case in a U.S. federal court. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1)
(2006). A well-prepared complainant can benefit from an accelerated schedule that effectively
limits the opportunities for discovery and motion practice. Another strategic reason that a patent
holder might choose to pursue relief through the USITC is to seek relief against the products of
entities with which the complainant enjoys a sensitive business relationship, such as its own
customers, without having to sue them in court. While this was often accomplished through the
downstream LEO that was rejected in Kyocera, it remains possible through a GEO. See 19
U.S.C. § 1337(d)(l)-(2) (2006). Moreover, in the wake of the Federal Circuit's eBay decision, a
patent holder may choose to litigate in the USITC because the USITC nearly automatically
issues an exclusion order if it finds a valid patent infringed, whereas a district court may refuse
to enter an injunction. See eBay Inc v. MereExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006)
(holding that an injunction should not automatically issue after a finding of patent infringement).
29. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A- 1l, 55 U.N.T.S.
194, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal-e/gatt47 e.pdf [hereinafter GATT].
30. "Article III protects expectations not of any particular trade volume but rather of the
equal competitive relationship between imported and domestic products." Japan-Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8, 10 & 1 /AB/R, 16 (Appellate Body Rept. adopted Nov. 1,
1996); see also United States-Section 337 of the TariffAct of 1930, 36th Supp. BISD 345, 386
(1990), 5.11 (GATT Panel Rept. adopted Nov. 7, 1989) ("The words 'treatment no less
favorable' in paragraph 4 call for effective equality of opportunities for imported products ...
."1)
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The national treatment obligation is not absolute, but the
exceptions are limited. Article XX of the 1947 GATT provides a
small number of enumerated exceptions including, inter alia,
measures found "necessary to secure compliance with laws or
regulations which are not inconsistent with [GATT rules
themselves].",31 "Necessary," in the context of Art. XX, means that no
less GATT-inconsistent measure is "reasonably available. 32
Moreover, a challenged measure will only allowed as an exception to
the national treatment obligation if the measure falls within one of the
enumerated exceptions and, further, is "not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries... or a disguised restriction on international
trade. 3 3 Certainly, the intellectual property laws of the United States
are not themselves inconsistent with the GATT. From the perspective
of international trade policy, then, the question is whether the USITC,
its procedures, and its remedial measures afford less favorable
treatment to imported products and, if so, whether they are
"necessary" to secure compliance with U.S. intellectual property
laws, or whether they operate as an arbitrary, unjustified, or disguised
restriction on international trade. To the extent downstream exclusion
of infringing imports is "necessary" to provide effective relief to U.S.
patent holders, it is therefore also consistent with the United States'
national treatment obligations.
II. IN KYoCERA, THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT LIMITED PATENT HOLDER'S
ABILITY TO OBTAIN DOWNSTREAM EXCLUSION THROUGH
LIMITED EXCLUSION ORDERS
The Federal Circuit panel in Kyocera found that the USITC is
explicitly prohibited by its governing statute from providing relief
through a limited exclusion order against the downstream products of
non-respondents. Relying strictly on an analysis of the language of
the amended text, the Kyocera panel held that "Section 337 permits
31. GATT, supra note 29, Art. XX(d). There are a number of general exceptions to the
national treatment obligation, including for example measures "necessary to protect ... life or
health" and those "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources." Id. Art. XX(a)-
0).
32. Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef WT/DS 161
& 169/AB/R, 166 (Appellate Body Rept. adopted Jan. 10, 2001).
33. See United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/AB/R, 150 (Appellate Body Rept. adopted Nov. 6, 1998) (The requirement that a
measure not operate as an arbitrary, unjustifiable, or disguised restriction on international trade
is a separate inquiry from whether the measure is "necessary.").
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exclusion of the imports of non-respondents only via a general
exclusion order, and then too, only by satisfying the heightened
requirements of 1337(d)(2)(A) or (B). The statute permits LEOs to
exclude only the violating products of named respondents."34
Prior to Kyocera, the USITC routinely issued limited exclusion
orders including some level of downstream relief when, after a full
EPROMs analysis, it determined that downstream exclusion was
necessary for effective relief. The USITC did so at least in part
because prior to Kyocera, indeed prior to the 1994 amendment to 19
U.S.C. § 1337(d), the Federal Circuit had held that exclusion orders
were in rem instruments, applicable against products, including
downstream products, not parties.35 In addition, Congress had
remarked that its 1994 amendment to § 1337(d) codifying the
requirements for a general exclusion order "[did] not differ
significantly from the current practice of the ITC .... ,36 Therefore,
the USITC continued to believe that it was authorized to provide
relief in appropriate cases by issuing an in rem limited exclusion
order excluding downstream products.
However, the Kyocera panel made clear this was no longer the
case. Focusing on the effect of the text added by the amendment to §
1337(d)(2),37 the Kyocera panel found that excluding the products of
persons not "determined... to be violating" as a respondent in the
investigation was a function now reserved for general exclusion
orders alone. Responding specifically to arguments that limited
34. Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1358 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
35. See SSIH Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 370 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (recognizing that the in rem nature of exclusion orders, "results in an order operative
against goods and is equally effective against those who participate as those who do not
participate in the proceeding"); Sealed Air Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 645 F.2d 976,
985-86 (CCPA 198 1) ("An exclusion order operates against goods, not parties.").
36. S. REP. No. 103-412 at 120 (1994). See also Certain Neodymium-Iron-Boron
Magnets, Magnet Alloys, and Articles Containing Same, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-372 (May
1996). The Commission examined the amended statute and determined that the two prongs of
the new § 1337(d)(2) were coextensive with and merely codified the factors it had previously
announced for determining when to issue a general exclusion order in Certain Airless Paint
Spray Pumps and Components Thereof USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-90 (Nov. 1981). Specifically,
the USITC found that the "certain business conditions" inquiry from Spray Pumps matched §
1337(d)(2)(A) and that the "widespread pattern of unauthorized use" inquiry from Spray Pumps
matched § 1337(d)(2)(B). See infra notes 54-57.
37. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(2) (2006) ("The authority of the Commission to order an
exclusion from entry of articles shall be limited to persons determined by the Commission to be
violating this section unless [the statutory requirements for issuing a general exclusion order are
found].").
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exclusion orders have historically been considered in rem orders, the
Kyocera court pointed to the amended language limiting exclusion to
"persons" determined by the Commission to be violating the section
as the legislative incorporation of an in personam element.38
In effect, the Federal Circuit ruled that although the 1994
amendment to § 1337(d), may not have changed the USITC's practice
with respect to general exclusion orders, the amendment, which was
ostensibly intended only to conform general exclusion orders to the
GATT Panel Report, had changed the USITC's statutory
authorization with respect to limited exclusion orders. According to
Kyocera, the USITC is no longer authorized to provide effective relief
against non-respondents' downstream products through a limited
exclusion order.
III. FOLLOWING KYOCERA, PATENT HOLDERS CAN STILL OBTAIN
DOWNSTREAM RELIEF
A. Downstream Relief Through A Limited Exclusion Order Is
Possible, If Not Always Practical
Downstream exclusion in a limited exclusion order is still
possible. Obviously, a patent holder seeking to prevent importation by
only named respondents would be unaffected by the Kyocera
decision.39 But this relief would likely be illusory as the manufacturer
of an infringing component may not directly import the product or
any downstream products into the U.S. Just as obviously, a patent
holder that can name all possible downstream infringers as
respondents would be able to obtain downstream relief,40 but this is
often impractical or impossible as the patent holder is unlikely to be
able to identify every possible foreign importer without extensive
discovery, or because the identities of the foreign importers change,
new importers arise, etc. Therefore, although downstream exclusion
through a limited exclusion order is still possible after Kyocera, it is
38. Kyocera, 545 F.3d at 1357 ("Broadcom and the ITC's desired interpretation ignores
the language of 337(d)(2), which incorporates the in personam element."). See also 19 U.S.C. §
1337(d)(2) (2006).
39. The Kyocera court reconciled an earlier Federal Circuit decision affirming
downstream exclusion on the grounds that the downstream products excluded were imported by
a respondent to the investigation. See Kyocera, 545 F.3d at 1357-58 (discussing Hyundai Elec.
Indus. Co. v. U.S. ITC, 899 F.2d 1204 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
40. See Kyocera, 545 F.3d at 1357 ("Broadcom chose to forego the full advantage of an
LEO's statutory scope by not naming known downstream respondents.").
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not an attractive option for obtaining effective relief.
B. Patent Holders Should Seek Downstream Exclusion in
Appropriate Cases Through a General Exclusion Order
Beyond the typically unattractive option of a limited exclusion
order that fails to provide effective relief against infringing imports,
patent holders should consider seeking a general exclusion order to
exclude downstream products, and the USITC should revise its
framework for analyzing whether downstream relief should be
granted.
The Kyocera decision confirmed, at least implicitly, that
downstream relief is available through a general exclusion order. In
Kyocera, the Federal Circuit did not simply restrict the limited
exclusion order in that case to the parties to that investigation; they
remanded the case so that "the Commission can reconsider its
enforcement options. '41 If the USITC were to continue its past
practice of providing only horizontal relief with a general exclusion
order, then the only enforcement option in light of the Kyocera
decision would be to require Section 337 complainants seeking
vertical exclusion of downstream products to join every importer of
infringing products. But for the reasons explained above, that would
be impractical and would render exclusion orders ineffective or easily
evaded in many cases. That was not the intention of the Kyocera
court,4 2  which stated that a patent holder concerned about
circumvention of a limited exclusion order "has the option to bring a
case under either subsection 337(d)(2)(A) or 337(d)(2)(B). 43
The USITC has always had "broad discretion in selecting the
form, scope and extent of the remedy." 4 The trade policy of the
United States, as outlined above, strongly supports robust intellectual
property protection against infringing foreign imports at the nation's
borders.45 Even the GATT Panel that ruled against Section 337 in
1988 acknowledged the difficulties of providing effective relief
against foreign importers,46 and outlined findings, now incorporated
41. Id. at 1358.
42. Id. at 1357 ("To the contrary, this court does not perceive that its ruling today renders
Section 337 relief illusory.").
43. Id.
44. Viscofan, S.A. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 787 F.2d 544, 548 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
45. See supra note 14.
46. See United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 5.32, L/6439 (Nov. 7,
1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) 345, 394-95 (1990) ("A limited in rem order applying to
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in 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(2)(A)-(B), that it believed could demonstrate
the necessity of providing in rem relief against non-parties to the
litigation.47 To the extent there were any lingering concerns about the
policy of intercepting infringing goods at the borders, those concerns
were put to rest in the drafting of the TRIPS agreement.48 The USITC
should use its discretion now to reevaluate the circumstances in which
it issues general exclusion orders, so that it may in appropriate
circumstances provide general exclusion orders encompassing
vertically tailored relief against infringing downstream imports.
The USITC will need to revisit is framework for general
exclusion orders. If the USITC is to provide effective relief against
infringing downstream imports, then it must focus on the actual
requirements of the statute, as codified by the 1994 amendment,
rather than focusing, as it has in the past, almost exclusively on the
Spray Pumps factors as the threshold for general exclusion orders.49
The statutory test did not codify the Spray Pumps factors, as the
USITC has assumed it did.50 The statutory test is, in fact, much
broader. For example, the statutory test is disjunctive, only requiring
proof that either (A) a general exclusion from entry of articles is
necessary to prevent circumvention of an exclusion order limited to
products of named persons; or (B) there is a pattern of violation of
this section and it is difficult to identify the source of infringing
products. 5' In contrast, the Spray Pumps test is conjunctive, requiring
proof of both the "business conditions" and "widespread pattern"
imported products can thus be justified, for the reasons presented in the previous paragraph, as
the functional equivalent of an injunction enjoining named domestic manufacturers.").
47. Compare id ("[T]here could sometimes be objective reasons why general in rem
exclusion orders might be 'necessary' in terms of Article XX(d) .... For example, in the case of
imported products it might be considerably more difficult to identify the source of infringing
products or to prevent circumvention of orders limited to the products of named persons, than in
the case of products of United States origin.") with 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(2)(A)-(B) (2006).
48. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14.
49. Spray Pumps, supra note 5 at 18. The Spray Pumps test requires showing both
"certain business conditions" from which one might reasonably infer the likelihood of
circumvention of an exclusion order and a "widespread pattern of unauthorized use" of the
patented invention.
50. The Federal Circuit corrected this misimpression in Vastfame Camera, Ltd. v. Int'l
Trade Comm'n, stating "Congress's intent in adding § 1337(d)(2) was to comply with its
obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, not to adopt the Commission's
policy objectives as announced in Certain Airless Paint Spray Pumps." Vastfame Camera, Ltd.
v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 386 F.3d 1108, 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing S. REP. NO. 103-412, at
120 (1994); H.R. REP. No. 103-826, at 140-42 (1994)).
51. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(2)(A)-(B) (2006).
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52prongs. Another example is that the statutory test does not require
that a pattern of violation be "widespread., 53 On its face, therefore,
Section 1337(d)(2) is much broader than the Spray Pumps test and
appears to encompass circumstances wherein general vertical
exclusion is necessary to prevent circumvention of a limited exclusion
order.
54
In addition to being a higher standard than required by the
statute, a brief look at the factors the USITC examines as part of its
Spray Pumps analysis quickly reveals that these factors are directed to
determining whether horizontal exclusion is appropriate. The Spray
Pumps factors, however, are ill-suited for a vertical analysis where
there is only one or a small number of manufacturers of an infringing
component who are capable of supplying a large number of potential
third-party importers of infringing downstream products. Under Spray
Pumps, the factors to which the USITC looks to prove a "widespread
pattern of unauthorized use" of a patented invention include:
(1) a Commission determination of unauthorized importation into
the United States of infringing articles by numerous foreign
manufacturers;
(2) the pendency of foreign infringement suits based upon foreign
patents which correspond to the domestic patent in issue; or
(3) other evidence which demonstrates a history of unauthorized
foreign use of the patented invention.
55
The factors to which the USITC looks to prove the required "business
conditions" include:
(1) an established demand for the patented product in the U.S.
market and conditions of the world market;
(2) the availability of marketing and distribution networks in the
United States for potential foreign manufacturers;
(3) the cost to foreign entrepreneurs of building a facility capable
of producing the patented article;
(4) the number of foreign manufacturers whose facilities could be
retooled to produce the patented article; or
(5) the cost to foreign manufacturers of retooling their facility to
52. See Spray Pumps, supra note 5 at 18.
53. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(2)(B) (2006) ("there is a pattern of violation of this section
and it is difficult to identify the source of infringing products").
54. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(2)(A) (2006).
55. See Spray Pumps, supra note 5 at 18-19.
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produce the patented articles.
56
Several of these factors make little sense in the context of a "vertical"
analysis. For example, the existence of factors (1) and (2) of the
"business conditions" prong seems self-evident where numerous
downstream products are already making their way into the country.
As another example, factors (3), (4), and (5) of the "business
conditions" prong, which relate generally to the concern that
additional manufacturer of an infringing product could easily enter
the market to replace the excluded products of a respondent, make
sense where the challenge to effective relief is "horizontal," i.e.,
concerning additional producers of "the patented article" itself.
However, these factors are irrelevant where the challenge to effective
relief is not new sources of "the patented article," but rather the
numerous and ever-shifting downstream products into which the
patented articles of existing manufacturers can be incorporated.
Because focusing exclusively on the Spray Pumps factors
imposes more than the statutory burden on patentees and would not
assist the USITC in determining whether to include vertical relief in a
general exclusion order, the USITC should begin its inquiry with the
statutory requirements of § 1337(d)(2). This is especially true in light
of the Kyocera court's admonishment that the USITC is "a creature of
statute, and must find authority for its actions in its enabling
statute.,
57
C. Where the USITC Finds that a General Exclusion Order is
Warranted Under the Statute, It Should Apply the EPROMs
and Spray Pumps Factors to Determine the Appropriateness
Of Vertical and Horizontal Exclusion
The USITC need not abandon Spray Pumps entirely. Where
complainants seek horizontal relief under a general exclusion order,
the Spray Pump factors might continue to provide the necessary
analysis. To the extent complainants will now seek vertical relief
under a general exclusion order, however, the Commission will need
to review different factors relevant to vertical exclusion. Those
factors, as it happens, have already been formulated and adopted by
the USITC. Specifically, the USITC should turn to the EPROMs
analysis that it employed to analyze potential vertical relief in limited
56. Id. at 19.
57. Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
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exclusion orders before Kyocera.
In EPROMs, the Commission formulated a test for analyzing the
necessity of downstream relief. In doing so, the Commission sought
to balance "the complainant's interest in obtaining complete
protection" against the potential "to disrupt legitimate trade in
products which were not themselves the subject of a finding of
violation of section 337 .58 The Commission provided a non-
exclusive list of factors to consider in light of this balancing:
In performing this balancing, the Commission may consider such
matters as the value of the infringing articles compared to the value
of the downstream products in which they are incorporated, the
identity of the manufacturer of the downstream products (i.e., are
the downstream products manufactured by the party found to have
committed the unfair act, or by third parties), the incremental value
to complainant of the exclusion of downstream products, the
incremental detriment to respondents of such exclusion, the
burdens imposed on third parties resulting from exclusion of
downstream products, the availability of alternative downstream
products which do not contain the infringing articles, the likelihood
that imported downstream products actually contain the infringing
articles and are thereby subject to exclusion, the opportunity for
evasion of an exclusion order which does not include downstream
products, the enforceability of an order by Customs, etc. This list is
not exclusive; the Commission may identify and take into account
any other factors which it believes bear on the question of whether
to extend remedial exclusion to downstream products, and if so to
what specific products.
59
The EPROMs test was formulated expressly for analyzing the
necessity of downstream relief in the context of a limited exclusion
order. Post-Kyocera, the same factors represent the appropriate
balancing in the context of downstream relief in the context of a
general exclusion order.
Although the USITC has not historically issued general
exclusion orders that do not extend horizontally, or that provide
vertical relief, support does exist for both. In Certain Agricultural
Tractors Under 50 Power Take-Off Horsepower,60 a grey market
case, the Commission issued a general exclusion order that was
58. See EPROMs, supra note 6, at 125.
59. Id. at 125-26.
60. Certain Agricultural Tractors Under 50 Power Take-Off Horsepower, USITC Inv.
No. 337-TA-380 at 43 (Mar. 12, 1997)
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horizontally limited, applying only to one manufacturer's products,
that is, "agricultural tractors under 50 power take-off horsepower that
are manufactured by Kubota Corporation of Japan and infringe the
federally registered U.S. trademark 'KUBOTA' .. . ." The Federal
Circuit affirmed the relief."6' Likewise, although the presiding
Administrative Law Judge ultimately recommended a general
exclusion order with no downstream exclusion in Certain
Neodymium-Iron-Boron Magnets, Magnet Alloys, and Articles
Containing Same,6 2 he did so only after finding that downstream
exclusion was not warranted under the particular facts of that case
after performing an EPROMs analysis.6 3
Extending general exclusion orders vertically is not without risk,
of course. Using both the Spray Pumps and EPROMs analysis, the
USITC could craft a general exclusion order that reaches both
horizontally and vertically, to an appropriately calibrated extent. The
risk of interfering with legitimate trade might increase substantially if
complainants were to seek both horizontal and vertical relief in the
same order. However, the Commission is well practiced at balancing
the policies of intellectual property protection against the risk of
unfairly burdening trade, and long ago developed the analytical ability
to do so effectively. Moreover, by divorcing the determination of
whether to issue a general exclusion order from the determination of
its appropriate scope, and by further separating the analyses of
whether to extend that scope horizontally or vertically, the
Commission might be in an even better position to analyze those risks
than it was prior to Kyocera. In any event, the Kyocera panel has
specifically instructed the USITC to "reconsider its enforcement
options," and the Commission must do so in a manner consistent with
its historical and statutory mandates. The framework proposed herein
allows the Commission to provide essential, non-illusory,
downstream relief via a "careful and common-sense balancing" of the
relevant interests. 64
61. Gamut Trading Co. v. U.S. Int' Trade Comm'n, 200 F.3d 775, 784 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
62. Certain Neodymium-Iron-Boron Magnets, Magnet Alloys, and Articles Containing
Same, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-372 at 25-29 (May 1996).
63. Id.
64. Hyundai Elec. Indus. Co. v. U.S. ITC, 899 F.2d 1204, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("The
Commission's remedy determination ... represents a careful and common-sense balancing of the
parties' interests as well as other relevant factors .... ).
